Patterns, Contents, and Causes
8 important questions on Patterns, Contents, and Causes
2 type of questions that may be raised concerning the apparent successes of folk psychology;
2. More philosophical or conceptual questions, such as, what must be the case if such commonsense explanations are to be good, proper, true, or otherwise legitimate for humans or for any other beings we may one day encounter?
How do mental representations get their content?
1. Content is itself fixed by the local properties of the system (intrinsic properties of the body and brain)
2. Content varies depending on broader properties such as the history of the system and the relations between its inner states and the states of the world
Scattered causation and ungrounded causation (Clark)
Ungrounded causation: when we confront a robust regularity and seek to establish it as casual with no reference to any underlying complex of physical influences -> one way to do this is to use a validation strategy like same-level-counterafctuals (if there were no global depression then there would be less unemployment in Ohio)
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Representational Theory of Mind (RTM) - Fodor
2. Mental processes are causal processes that involve transitions between internal representations
The language of thought revisited - Fodor, 2008
- There are increasingly good reasons to doubt that the 'classical' RTM LOT CTM model is anything like a general account of how the cognitive mind works
- RTM = Representational theory of mind
- LOT = Language of Thought
- CTM = Computational theory of mind
- Those accounts satisfy compositionality, but not globality
- The more a mental process is plausibly not local, the less we understand it; we have no account of computation that isn't local
Churchland on folk psychology
- it works only in a limited domain (some aspects of the mental life of normal human agents)
- its origin and evolution give cause for concern
- it does not seem to "fit in" with the rest of our scientific picture of ourselves
Fuzzy scattered realism (Dennett)
1. There is no clean dividing line in nature- just a bag of design innovations that may be more or less shared with other entities
2 there is no reason to suppose that to each ascribed belief there corresponds some simple neural state or "inner sentence"
Welke drie filosofische posities over folk psychology bespreekt Clark?
- Fodor (realisme): beliefs en desires zijn echte mentale toestanden, zinnen in een “taal van het denken”.
- Churchlands (eliminativisme): folk psychology is een foutieve theorie, te vervangen door neurowetenschappen.
- Dennett (mild realisme): beliefs en desires zijn abstracta; de intentional stance rechtvaardigt hun gebruik.
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